The Philippines : recent performance, prospects for 1989-90, and policy and development issues by Yap, Josef T. & Lamberte, Mario B.
THE PHILIPPINES: RECENT PERFORMANCE, 
PROSPECTS FOR 1989-90, AND 
POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 
by 
Josef T. Yap and Mario B. Lamberte 
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 89-01 
January 1989 
Philippine Institute for Development StudieX 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction 1 
II. Recent Economic Performance 5 
III. Future Prospects 15 
IV. Major Economic Policies and Development Issues 22 
V. Conclusion 40 
References 42 
LIST OF TABLES 
I. Economic Growth, Employment, and Savings and 
Investment 4 5 
II. Inflation, Money Supply and Growth Budget 46 
III. Trade and Balance of Payments 4 7 
IV. Financial Flows and External Debt 48 
THE PHILIPPINES: RECENT PERFORMANCE, 
PROSPECTS FOR 1989-90, AND 
POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES1" 
by 
Josef T . Yap and Mario B . Lanberte** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Aquino administration assumed power in 1986, 
the most pressing items in its agenda were political 
stabilization and economic recovery. Since that time, the 
political normalization process has virtually been completed 
with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, 
the convening of the Congress, and the election of local 
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officials. Complete political stability, however, has not 
been achieved as the threat from extreme rightwing and 
leftwing elements has not been eliminated. Moreover, graft 
and corruption still remains a thorny issue, something that 
the government must address seriously in the near future. 
Parallel developments were observed in the economic 
sphere. A series of reforms, which were initiated in 1983, 
were pursued more vigorously sinoe early 1986. These 
include the dismantling of monopolistic market arrangements 
in the agricultural sector, the removal of interest rate 
ceilings and subsidized credit programs, the streamlining of 
the public investment program, and the simplification of the 
tax system making it more efficient and equitable. 
Reprivatization has also been going on, albeit at a 
slow pace. As a result of these reforms and also because of 
the general restoration of confidence in the economy, 
positive growth rates were attained in 1986 and 1987, a 
marked improvement over the performance during the 1984-85 
period. Preliminary data show a robust growth of 6.7 per 
cent in 1988 and this is expected to hit at least 7 percent 
when the final data are tabulated.3- While the performance 
of the economy is above the government target of 6.4, some 
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economists have expressed doubt whether this trend, which is 
consistent with the government target for the next three 
years, could be sustained. The dwindling level of foreign 
exchange reserves, the external debt overhang, and the 
limited supply of power and energy are some of the factors 
that could undermine the drive towards high growth rates. 
It is quite clear that government policy will play a 
vital role in determining whether the achievements of the 
first three years of the Aquino administration could be 
carried into the medium term. Several key issues come to 
mind. First, the economic managers must get their act 
together especially in the handling of the external debt 
problem. It must be ascertained that any solution to reduce 
the debt overhang must not be regressive in nature. Second, 
economic policy makers must emphasize the goal of equity in 
their programs as is the case with the Medium Term 
Philippine Development Plan. The Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Program (CARP) is a step in this direction. Third, 
the government must further streamline its infrastructure 
program so that it would be more responsive to the 
requirements of high growth rates without being inflationary 
at the same time. Fourth, the government must improve its 
capacity to absorb official development assistance (ODA) 
being offered by friendly countries. The utilization rate 
of ODAs has been very low since 1986. Lastly, the stage 
must be set so that the Philippines could play a significant 
role in the coming Pacific Century. The ability of the 
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country to attract foreign investment beneficial to the 
economy is a crucial factor in this case. 
This paper discusses the recent economic performance of 
the Philippines, prospects in the economy for the next two 
years, economic policies undertaken in recent years and 
planned in the near future, and some development issues. 
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II. RECENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
A. Economic Growth and Sectoral Perfnrmanoft 
Based on the most recent data from the National 
Statistical Coordinating Board (NSCB), the growth rate of 
GNP in 1987 was 5.9 percent, up from a figure of 2 percent 
recorded in 1986.* While this was below the government 
target of 6.5 percent, it is a sign that the Philippine 
economy has recovered from the Balance-of-Payments crisis in 
1983-85. The economic growth in 1987 is often described as 
consumer-led which is not without reason as personal 
consumption expenditures and government consumption, which 
comprise more than 80 percent of GNP, grew at a combined 
rate of 6.3 percent. The 10 percent hike in government 
salaries contributed substantially to this increase. 
Critics were quick to point out that reliance on consumption 
demand would not sustain the recovery as the economy would 
most certainly encounter constraints in the form of 
limitations in industrial capacity. Thus, one of the more 
crucial factors in the 1988 scenario would be whether 
economic activity had shifted towards higher investment and 
less dependence on consumption expenditures. 
Preliminary data for 1988 have yielded encouraging 
figures for the Philippine economy. Not only has the annual 
growth rate climbed to 7.07 percent, the increase in 
consumption expenditures has declined to 5.9 percent, while 
3unlo"»" oth.rwl„ th«. growth >"<•.* — «» r-«» 1 -
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gross domestic capital formation remained steady with a 
growth rate of 26.5 percent. A more detailed examination of 
the data reveals that the second semester growth rates for 
consumption and investment were 5.4 percent and 49.7 per 
cent respectively, a strong indication that demand has 
shifted towards the investment side. 
Sectoral performance was more balanced in 1988 than it 
was in the previous year. The industry sector still led the 
way with a growth rate of 9 ; 4 5 percent compared to 7 per 
cent in 1987. 3 The agricultural, fishery, and forestry 
sector sufficiently recovered from the ill effects of the 
drought in 1987 to post a 3.1 percent growth rate in 1988. 
The performance of the service sector was relatively stable 
as the growth rates in 1987 and 1988 are almost identical at 
7.35 and 7.5 percent respectively. 
The country continued to experience a construction boom 
in 1988 and this was the main source of growth in the 
industry sector. In the first quarter of the year, the 
private sector accounted for most of the growth as 
government construction activity fell by 4.8 percent. The 
main reasons for the sluggish performance in government 
construction during this period was the election ban on 
public construction, and snags that hit the government 
infrastructure program due to poor availment of loans and 
grants, procedural red tape, and the poor start in 
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government housing because of prohibitive interest rates and 
the reluctance of private developers to support the 
government socialized housing program. On the other hand, 
the upswing in private construction could be traced to the 
increase in demand for commercial and residential centers 
and the greater availability of housing loans. Since then 
government construction activity has moved up significantly 
posting a 7.8 percent growth during 1988 compared to the 
15.1 percent increase in the private sector. Manufacturing 
activity also contributed a considerable amount to the 
growth in the industry sector. Much of the 9.3 percent 
increase in this subsector could be traced to the rise in 
food manufactures which grew at the rate of 8.4 percent 
although, several manufacturing groups posted growth rates 
of more than 10 percent. 
Agricultural crops accounted for a great deal of the 
turnaround in the agricultural, fishery, and forestry 
sector. From a decline of 4.1 percent in 1987, this 
subsector grew at a rate close to 1 percent in 1988. 
Actually, for the first three quarters of 1988, the 
agricultural crops subsector was growing at the rate of 2.25 
percent but much of the improvement was wiped out by the 
devastating typhoons which passed through the Philippines in 
the last quarter of the same year. Crops which experienced 
relatively high growth rates were palay and sugar with the 
former having a 15 percent turnaround (from a decline of 7.9 
percent in 1987 to a growth of 6.8 percent in 1988) and the 
latter experiencing a similar turnaround of 20 percent (from 
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a decline of 9.5 percent in 1987 to a growth of 10.9 per 
cent in 1988). The Rice Productivity Enhancement Program 
(RPEP) which was instituted in 1987 may have contributed to 
the higher yield in palay while the rise in sugar prices may 
have stimulated production in this sector. Still the higher 
growth rates in 1988 could be attributed mainly to the low 
levels of output in 1987. 
B. Employment and Labor Force 
There was a general improvement in the employment 
situation in 1988. The unemployment rate was registered at 
9.7 percent in 1988 compared to 11.2 percent in 1987, while 
the underemployment rate went down to 32.6 percent from 33.8 
percent. Despite these figures, however, it is estimated 
that the full time equivalent unemployment rate in 1988 
increased slightly to 18 percent from 17.2 percent in 1987. 
This was due largely to the increase in the labor force 
participation rate which rose from 65.5 percent in 1987 to 
66.2 percent in 1988 reaching an all time high of 67.9 per 
cent in April 1988. 
The percentage distribution of employment across 
sectors was relatively stable although the share of 
agriculture, fishery, and forestry declined from 48.6 per 
cent in 1987 to 47.3 percent in 1988. This is a 
manifestation of the greater increase in economic activity 
in the industry and service seotors. However, the change in 
the composition of the work force is only marginal compared 
to the difference in the growth rates among sectors. This 
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observation underscores the problem of the inequitable 
distribution of income in the country. 
Overseas employment continued to be a source of relief 
to the unemployment problem as a total of 319,000 workers 
were deployed for the first eight months of 1988, increasing 
by 5.3 percent from the previous year's level. 
C. Money S U D P I V . Inflation, and Interest Rates 
In spite of the efforts of the Central Bank to curb the 
inflation rate and keep it within 7-8 percent, the Consumer 
Price Index in 1988 averaged approximately 8.8 percent 
higher than the figure in 1987. Several factors accounted 
for this. There was initial confusion on how to implement 
the VAT system resulting in arbitrary increases in prices. 
The consumer-led growth in 1987 spilled into the first half 
of 1988 and since industrial capacity was near its limit, 
the result was inflationary pressure from the demand side. 
The deterioration in the international reserve position of 
the Central Bank led to the depreciation of the peso thereby 
increasing the costs of imports. Prices could have been 
higher if not for the decrease in the prices of petroleum 
products and the continued implementation of the import 
liberalization program which had a negative effect on the 
prices of some imported commodities. Central Bank 
intervention in the foreign exchange market helped prop up 
the value of the peso and this also mitigated the rise in 
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import prices. It is interesting to note that as a whole 
the implicit price index for imports fell by 10 percent in 
1988. 
In order to arrest any further depreciation of the 
peso, the Central Bank also adopted a tight money stance in 
1988 by issuing short term reverse repurchase agreements at 
higher-than-market interest rates. This was reflected in 
the monetary base in 1988 (estimated to be 63.7 billion as 
of the yearend), which was roughly only 4 percent higher 
than the 1987 figure. This, however, did not prevent total 
liquidity to expand by 11 percent, as the money multiplier, 
which is driven by demand forces, rose from 2.72 in 1987 to 
2.93 in 1988. Tighter money also resulted in higher 
interest rates. The 91 day Treasury Bill rate registered a 
high of 17 percent as of December 1988 to post an annual 
average of 14.5 percent, up from 11.4 percent in 1987. 
D. Ravings and Investment 
Gross domestic capital formation at constant prices 
expanded at the rate of 26.5 percent in 1988 almost equal to 
the figure in 1987. However, as mentioned earlier this 
belies the fact that much of the investment activity was 
carried out in the second semester. Investment in durable 
equipment posted the biggest increase at 34.6 percent. 
Approved equity for the first three quarters of 1988 
increased by 98.2 percent, from 6.7 billion recorded during 
the same period last year, to 13.4 billion. Of this total, 
local investments comprised 45 percent or 6.06 billion, 
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while the rest, which amounted to 7.34 billion, was 
accounted for by foreign investors. The latter represented 
a 186.7 percent increase from a figure of 2.56 billion in 
1987. Taiwanese investment accounted for 2.26 billion 
(around $107 million) of these foreign investments with 220 
million going to the Petrochemical plant in Bataan, and it 
is expected that this figure could reach $150 million for 
the whole of 1988. The increase in foreign investments 
partly reflects the greater confidence foreign businessmen 
have in the Philippine economy, and is also due to the huge 
current account surpluses the NICs have accumulated during 
the past few years and the efficacy of the new Omnibus 
Investment Code and of the debt-to-equity conversion 
program. 
Much of the investment was poured into manufacturing 
concerns with agricultural endeavors ranking second and 
energy related products coming in third. Despite this surge 
in investment activity, the overall investment rate was only 
16 percent of GNP, which is still substantially lower than 
the 20-25 percent rate recommended by the World Bank. 
The present ability of the economy to mobilize domestic 
savings was still relatively weak. This can be gleaned from 
the national savings rate which was 15 percent in 1988 and 
16.3 percent in 1987. And judging from the persistent 
def icit in the current account, the Philippine economy 
relies heavily on foreign savings to support its investment 
expenditures. 
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E. Budget Developments 
The estimated budget deficit in 1988 was higher than 
anticipated - P25 billion instead of the targeted P22 
billion. As of November 1988, the revenue shortfall was P15 
billion, with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) 
accounting for 6.6 billion and the Bureau of Customs having 
a collection shortfall of 3.6 billion. There were three 
major causes of the underperformance of the BIR in terms of 
revenue collection, namely: the non-implementation of 
ceilings on allowable deductions of corporations, the 
confusion regarding the implementation of the VAT system, 
and the lower effective rates on petroleum products. On the 
other hand, the Bureau of Customs attributed its shortfall 
to a lower than assumed exchange rate which prevailed during 
the first quarter, a refund of excess duties and taxes paid 
on past imports, and the continued defrayal of tax and duty 
payments on imports of government agencies and government 
corporations. 
The revenue shortfall, however, will be matched by a 
similar difference between planned and actual expenditures. 
It is estimated that out of the P150.4 billion originally 
earmarked, only P139.2 billion will be utilized. 
Bureaucratic red tape that slows down the implementation of 
several projects is the culprit in this case. The combined 
shortfall in both revenues and expenditures will increase 
the budget deficit by approximately P3 billion. 
F. External Seotnr Performance 
Because of the surge in economic activity in 1988, 
import requirements rose along with the demand for certain 
imported items. The latter was bolstered by the import 
liberalization program and an overvalued exchange rate, with 
both factors having a negative impact on the prices of 
imported goods. The net result was a 33.5 percent increase 
in imports of goods and services at constant peso terms. 
Exports of goods and services continued to lag behind 
imports, posting only a 13.5 percent increase. The 
Philippines again banked on the performance of 
nontraditional exports with semiconductors and electronic 
microcircuits posting a growth rate of 30.5 percent and 
garments expanding at the rate of 11 percent. Crude coconut 
oil continued its dismal performance with exports of this 
commodity declining for a second straight year at -25.8 
percent. 
The difference in merchandise trade in dollar terms was 
not as great. Merchandise imports grew by 21.7 percent 
while merchandise exports registered a 21 percent increase. 
Nevertheless, the difference was enough to widen the trade 
balance which stood at $1.28 billion in 1988 compared to 
$1.02 billion in the previous year. Despite higher workers 
remittances and the increase in net inflows from the 
transfer account (personal remittances and aids/grants from 
foreign governments) the current account is projected to 
deteriorate in 1988, ending up at a deficit of $776 million 
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compared to a deficit of $539 million in 1987. This was 
caused by the higher deficit in the trade balance and the 
increased interest payment on the external debt obligation 
that was attributed to higher world interest rates. The 
total debt service due in 1988 was calculated at $3.36 
billion up from last year's figure of $3.06 billion. This 
represents roughly 30 percent of exports. 
Overall, the balance of payments stood at a deficit of 
$196 million in 1988, a figure which already incorporates 
rescheduling. It is expected though that there will be 
inflows of new money towards the end of 1988, some of which 
are from OECF funds, and these will be enough to offset the 
deficit resulting in a surplus of $500 million. However, 
these inflows should not affect the performance in 1988 and 
hence should be considered as part of 1989 capital inflows. 
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III. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
A. Economic Growth and Sectoral Performance 
Much of the growth in 1989 will be a spillover from the 
momentum generated in 1988. Investment projects started in 
1988 will be completed in 1989 as businessmen adjust towards 
their optimum level of capital stock. A gestation period 
that must transpire before investments become fully 
productive will make for a deceleration sometime towards the 
latter part of 1989 and in the greater part of 1990. 
Furthermore, a recession in the U.S. is predicted in 1989 
and the repercussions of this slowdown will have a similar 
timing in their effects on the Philippine economy. Foreign 
investment should continue to flow in with Japanese playing 
a more significant role. Part of this investment will arise 
as a result of the "investment indigestion" occurring in 
Thailand. The growth rate in real GNP should be about 6.4 
percent in 1989, close to the government target of 6.5 per 
cent. This figure should decline in 1990 as many countries 
will be reeling from the effects of a U.S. recession. It is 
estimated that the GNP growth rate in 1990 will be a 
respectable 5.3 percent. 
While the projected growth rate in GNP is similar to 
the government target, it is significantly different from 
the 1989 forecast presented by the Center for Research and 
Communication (CRC) which is 5.4 percent. This figure is 
based on a probable increase in power outages, the 
constraint posed by a limited amount of foreign exchange 
reserves, and the inefficient procedure in the disbursement 
of government expenditures. A senior vice-president of the 
same institution, however, has an optimistic view for 1989. 
His forecast of at least 7 percent rests on the assumption 
that foreign investments will flood the economy in 1989. 
The Bank of Philippine Islands has also come out with its 
own prediction. The latter is rather pessimistic though. 
The projected value of 4.5 percent growth in GNP is mainly a 
result of an unrealistic value of the annual average of the 
exchange rate, which is assumed to be P22.5/dollar. Judging 
from these various forecasts, the 6.4 percent growth rate 
would seem reasonable. 
The industry sector should still be at the forefront as 
much of the investment in the past was in this sector. 
Barring any unforeseen catastrophes, the agriculture, 
fishery, and forestry sector will grow steadily. This 
sector should profit from the emphasis placed by the 
government on rural development and regional decen-
tralization. The benefits of this growth should accrue to 
more people with the implementation of CARP. 
Both the industry and service sector will be hardest 
hit by the economic deceleration. This is to be expected as 
the products in these sectors have the greater income 
elasticities. 
B. Employment and Labor Faroe 
With a population growth that shows no sign of a 
letdown, the labor force is expected to grow and with it the 
full time equivalent unemployment rate. The latter will 
increase to 19 percent by 1989 and 20.5 percent in 1990. A 
danger arising from a world recession would be a drop in the 
demand for Philippine contract workers which would aggravate 
the unemployment problem. Hopefully, the investments made 
in these years would be in more labor-intensive industries 
which would then absorb a greater proportion of the work 
force. 
c . H o n e y S u p p l y . I n f l a t i o n , a n d I n t e r e s t R a t e s 
So long as Mr. Jose Fernandez will remain the governor 
of the Central Bank, there will be no major change in the 
thrust of monetary policy. The peso will continue to 
depreciate at a moderate pace, from P21.1/dollar in 1988 to 
P21.96 in 1988 and to P23.06 in 1990. Hence, inflation in 
1989 and 1990 will be at manageable levels, estimated at 7 
and 8.6 percent, respectively. The numbers could easily 
change, though, depending on a number of factors. The oil 
price could very well revert back to $18/barrel, 20 percent 
higher than the present assumption of $15/barrel. If this 
event occurs sometime during the middle of the year, the 
inflation rate is estimated to rise by 1 percentage point 
while the GNP growth rate will decline by the same amount. 
The budget deficit could suddenly swell what with the 
inefficient tax collection system. This would either lead 
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to a further expansion in money supply or a hike in interest 
rates. Assumptions on the latter variable are already at a 
relatively high level of 17.5 percent for 1989 and 17 
percent in 1990. The figures are consistent with an 
expected budget deficit of P23 billion in both years. 
As it is, total liquidity is predicted to grow at 11 
percent in 1989 and 14 percent in 1990. Part of this 
increase reflects the improved international reserves 
position of the Central Bank. 
D- Savings and Investment 
With the expected speedier processing of public 
projects, the government will intensify its pump priming 
activities especially in the rural sector. Gross capital 
formation arising from the public sector should post a hefty 
growth close to 22 percent. This is threatened though by 
recommendations from the IMF which are aimed at cutting down 
the budget deficit through a reduction in public 
expenditure. 
Private sector investment, boosted by the steady stream 
of foreign investment should expand, by around 18.6 percent 
in 1989. The latter will be lower than the figure attained 
in 1988 because of the higher interest rates that will arise 
as a result of the government budget deficit and the desire 
of the Central Bank to control inflation (see section E). 
A significant amount of the capital formation will flow into 
projects whicJi-'-Were started in 1988. The general slowdown 
of the eooriomy in 1990 will also affect investment decisions 
and this will translate into a fall in the growth rate of 
gross capital formation from 17,1 percent in 1989 to 14.2 
percent in 1990. 
The efforts of the government to enhance capital 
outlays will translate into a higher investment rate. The 
latter will increase from 16 percent of real GNP in 1988 to 
17.6 percent and 19.1 percent in 1989 and 1990, 
respectively. Despite this improvement, the investment rate 
will still be below the 20 percent threshold level. The 
savings rate will fare no better, with the national savings 
rate consistently falling below the investment rate at 17.2 
percent in 1989 and 18.2 percent in 1990. 
E. Budget Developments 
The programmed expenditures and revenue collections are 
projected to lead to a deficit of approximately P23 billion 
both in 1989 and 1990. Given the marginal improvement in 
the savings behavior, the reluctance of foreign creditors to 
pour in new money, and the conservative position of the 
Central Bank, the deficit spending of the government would 
most probably crowd out private investment. The crowding 
out effect will manifest itself in the form of higher 
interest rates, which in turn will have a negative effect on 
If the government agrees to the terms imposed by the 
IMF, it is estimated that the growth rate in GfHP-^n 1989 and 
1990 will dip to 6 and 4.8 percent respectively, Ori ithe 
other hand, a bloated budget deficit would be highly 
inflationary. It is estimated that a PI billion increase in 
the government defic,>fe^ould add 1 percentage point to the 
inflation rate. 
F. External SeQtOX Performance 
The impending recession in the United States, the 
general deceleration in the economy, and the worldwide drift 
towards greater protectionism, all these factors would lead 
to a decline in both imports and exports. However, because 
of the structure of the Philippine economy, imports would 
decrease at a slower pace - 10.3 percent in 1989 and 8.1 
percent in 1990, as compared to 8.5 and 4.9 percent for 
exports. The trade balance will thus continue its slide, 
reaching a deficit of $1.8 billion in 1989 and $1.8 billion 
in 1990. A parallel deterioration will be observed in the 
current account which will register a deficit of $1.07 
billion in 1989 and $1.5 billion in 1990. 
It is expected that the Philippine panel will come to 
terms with the IMF and the foreign creditors sometime early 
this year. Capital inflows will thus be augmented giving 
rise to a BOP surplus of $1.46 billion in 1989 and 
approximately $500 million in 1990. Debt-service payments 
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will increase further, reaching $3.44 billion in 1989 and 
$3.89 billion in 1990. This represents a debt-service 
burden of 27 percent in 1989 and 28 percent in 1990. 
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IV. MAJOR ECONOMIC POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 
Since the beginning of this decade, the Philippines has 
introduced a number of reforms. Some of these were started 
by the previous regime and pursued more vigorously by the 
Aqu ino government. In addition, the present government 
introduced new measures which the previous regime found 
difficult to implement given the interest groups that it 
sought to protect. This section briefly reviews some major 
economic policies undertaken in recent years and/or planned 
in the near future and some development issues. 
A. Ma.ior Economic Policies 
Monetary and Banking Policies 
Recently, the Central Bank has shifted its emphasis 
from credit allocation function to stabilization function 
and has removed ceilings on deposit and lending rates. 
These are the most significant changes in the conduct of 
monetary policy since the creation of the Central Bank. In 
the past, the Central Bank tried to influence the flow of 
credit to highly favored economic activities by making 
available to them cheap funds. Beginning in November 1985, 
all rediscountable papers are treated uniformly in terms of 
rediscount rate and loan value. Since then, the rediscount 
rate has been aligned with the market rate. 
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The withdrawal of short-term Central Bank bills is in 
line with the current thrust of making the Treasury bills 
the primary instrument for open market operations. 
Beginning in the last quarter of 1986, Treasury bills have 
been auctioned to accredited financial institutions. This 
system enables the government to adjust the maturity pattern 
of Treasury bills with its annual cash budget program while 
the interest rates on its securities are aligned with the 
market rates. Thus, the era of low-yielding government 
securities has come to pass. Likewise, reserve eligible 
government securities are gradually being phased out. 
The Treasury bills being auctioned at present have 
shorter maturities (i.e., not more than one year). There 
are now plans to issue long-term securities. However, the 
prevailing high interest rates may prevent the government 
from issuing long-term Treasury bills in the next few 
months. 
Reforms in the banking system are being pursued more 
vigorously. The six commercial banks which the government 
took over during the height of the liquidity crisis in 1981 
have now substantial private sector participation or are in 
the process of being sold to private investors. A 
rehabilitation scheme has been devised to revive the rural 
banking system. As of October, 1988, 522 out of 1,018 
licensed rural banks applied for rehabilitation. So far, 
473 applications were approved. 
Some progress has already been made as regards the 
rehabilitation of the two large government banks, namely the 
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the 
Philippines (DBP). The transfer of non-performing assets 
worth P108 billion for the two banks to the Asset 
Privatization Trust has enabled them to resume their normal 
operations with clean balance sheets. These banks have 
again realized substantial profits in the past two years. 
The government has forced these banks to be competitive by 
lessening special privileges given to them. For example, 
they are no longer sole depositories of government funds. 
Monetary policy since 1986 has been generally tight. 
In particular, the growth rate in base money has been held 
in check and reserve requirement has remained high at 21 
percent. But it is less tight than the crisis period. The 
same monetary policy is expected to prevail in the next two 
years in view of the precarious balance-of-payments 
position, low level of gross international reserves and of 
the below double-digit inflation target. 
External Debt Management 
One of the accomplishments of the present government 
was the successful conclusion of restructuring agreements 
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with both the Paris Club and foreign commercial bank 
creditors. This somewhat eased up the debt burden of the 
country and provided it with opportunity to divert resources 
for financing growth. For new borrowings since 1986, the 
government opted to obtain concessionary loans from official 
sources and multilateral agencies. 
Simultaneous with the restructuring agreements was the 
introduction of the debt-to-equity conversion program to 
help reduce he debt burden. However, in view of the 
substantial liquidity effect of this program, the Central 
Bank recently has slowed down the number of approvals for 
conversion. In fact, the recent approvals are those that do 
not have liquidity effects at all. 
At present, the government is still looking for a 
market-oriented debt management strategy that would protect 
the country from any adverse external developments, such as 
a rise in interest rate in the international market. At the 
same time, efforts are now made to avail of the Extended 
Fund Facility of the IMF. This is crucial in restructuring 
the currently maturing loans owed to the Paris Club and in 
negotiating new money from foreign commercial banks. 
At Congress, the Senate recently has approved the bill 
imposing a limit on the country's debt repayments equivalent 
to 20 percent of the preceding year's net foreign exchange 
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receipts. However, the House has deferred its deliberation 
on a similar bill until after the government has completed a 
satisfactory agreement with the IMF, Paris Club and foreign 
private creditors. 
Exchange Rate Poliov 
A sharp depreciation in the real effective exchange 
rate (about 26 percent) occurred in 1986. Thereafter, 
depreciation was kept below 10 percent per year. However, 
the nominal depreciation of the peso vis-a-vis the dollar 
was very minimal since 1986. Thus, the large depreciation 
in the real effective exchange rate was mainly due to the 
substantial depreciation of the peso vis-a-vis major 
currencies other than the dollar. 
Although the Central Bank claims that the Philippines 
is following a freely floating exchange rate system, in 
reality, however, it has managed the movements of the 
exchange rate. That is, the Central Bank has been 
intervening to prof up the peso. Intervention has been done 
by directly purchasing foreign exchange from banks and/or 
offering higher interest rates for its borrowings from banks 
through the reverse repurchase window. Its heavy 
intervention in the foreign exchange market in the past two 
years has actually resulted in the deterioration in the 
gross international reserves and higher domestic interest 
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rates. That this strategy can cool off speculative attacks 
on the peso is indeed questionable. Although it saves the 
government from carrying heavier external debt burden since 
it assumes a large amount of foreign currency denominated 
debt s, however, it does not free it from paying high 
interest on its securities. 
Trade Policy 
The tariff reform program initiated in 1980 was 
completed on schedule in 1985. In particular, the average 
nominal tariff level was reduced from 41 percent to 28 
percent and the dispersion in rates narrowed from 0 - 100 
percent in 1980 to 10 - 50 percent in 1985 with a few 
exemptions. 
Trade liberalization was reversed in 1983 when a 
balance-of-payments crisis struck the economy. It was 
resumed in 1988 when the economy showed some signs of 
recovery. The proportion of regulated items to total number 
of PSCC lines has been reduced from 36 percent in 1980 to 12 
percent in 1988. Of the remaining 673 items, 114 items are 
regulated mainly for reasons of health, safety and security. 
The Subcommittee on Tariff and Related Matters has already 
recommended 104 items for liberalization. However, 
resistance from strong lobby groups seems to have succeeded 
in delaying the liberalization of these items. Up to now, 
28 
there is no definite schedule of liberalization for these 
items. The rest of the 673 items are still under review by 
the Subcommittee. These items include those under the BOI 
Industry Program and agricultural commodities. 
Although tariff adjustments have been made to help 
smoothen the impact of the recent import liberalization, 
these, however, appear to be minimal judging from the fact 
that the average tariff rate remains almost the same. 
Other significant trade policy reforms recently 
introduced include the elimination of the coconut and sugar 
trading monopolies, the abolition of the meat importation 
cartel, the turnover of wheat, flour, and soybean trading to 
the private sector, the breaking up of the fertilizer cartel 
and removal of export taxes on all agricultural products. 
Fiscal Policy 
Substantial policy reforms have also been made in the 
fiscal arena. Tax exemptions of government-owned and/or 
controlled corporations (GOCCs) have been withdrawn in 1986. 
This has actually forced those earning corporations to 
contribute to the National Treasury while subsidies to 
losing corporations are made more transparent. The 
Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee 
is tasked with the strengthening of the institutional and 
financial capabilities of government corporations through 
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the introduction of improved corporate planning, 
computerized accounting, and the implementation of 
performance monitoring, evaluation and incentive systems. 
To broaden the tax base, the value added tax (VAT) has 
been applied since January 1988. It has replaced the 
escalating sales taxes and other percentage taxes. The 
confusion in the initial implementation of the VAT has 
partly contributed to the increase in the price level in 
1988. Moreover, the revenue generated by the VAT did not 
come up to expectations. 
To encourage more direct foreign investments, the new 
Omnibus Investments Code has replaced the admittedly 
performance-oriented incentives provided by the previous law 
with the income tax holiday and the exemption from duties 
and taxes on imported capital equipment. Enterprises 
registered with the BOI are also allowed an additional 
deduction from taxable income of an amount equal to 50 
percent of incremental labor expense. The corporate income 
tax has been reduced to a uniform level of 35 percent. 
The on-going efforts towards decentralization and 
developing local autonomy demand that local governments be 
given greater autonomy in exercising their taxation powers. 
The National Government has now reviewed plans to this 
effect. 
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As regards expenditure, there appears to be a 
significant reallocation of resources from the economic 
sectors to the social services sectors since the Aquino 
government assumed power. This is consistent with its 
policy pronouncements. The infrastructure/utilities sector 
has also received much attention by the present government. 
However, the ratio of expenditure on infrastructure/ 
utilities sector to GNP in the most recent past and in 1989 
still cannot compare with that of the pre-crisis year which 
averaged 5 percent. Noteworthy is the high proportion of 
debt service to total government budget which is estimated 
to post at about 44 percent of the 1989 budget. 
Recently, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) 
has introduced a new disbursement scheme. Under this 
scheme, once DBM issues Treasury Warrant to a bank in favor 
of a particular government agency, automatically said agency 
has funds in that bank. To service the requirements of 
those agencies located in areas where there is no government 
bank, the DBM utilizes branches of accredited commercial 
banks as depositories of its funds. This scheme is thought 
to reduce red tape and accelerate the implementation of 
government projects. The old practice was for government 
agencies to get Treasury Warrants from the National Treasury 
upon authorization from the DBM. 
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The government is planning to introduce reforms in the 
budgetary process which will institutionalize 
regionalization of budgetary procedure. This is consistent 
with the thrust towards decentralization and accountability. 
Wage Policy 
When the new government took over, it announced a 
policy on non-intervention in wage setting. Instead, it has 
concentrated its efforts in providing services to the labor 
sector to enhance their bargaining power. Lately, however, 
Congress passed a bill that increased the minimum wages of 
agricultural and non-agricultural workers. This is 
inconsistent with the avowed policy of the government. At 
present, the government is not keen in monitoring the 
compliance of such law. It must be recalled that compliance 
of minimum wage law has been very low even during the 
martial law years. 
The present government has restored the basic rights of 
workers including the right to strike. The number of 
actual labor strikes surged in 1986 to 581 cases involving 
169,000 workers. Since then, it has declined. In 1988, the 
number of strikes went down to less than 260 cases involving 
about 70,000 workers. 
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B. Development Issues 
Increasing employment opportunities and incomes, 
alleviating the poverty situation and improving income 
distribution will continue to be the primary goals of the 
country for the next ten years. Unfortunately, the 1983 
balance-of-payments crisis had set back the development 
process. For instance, the 1981 real per capita income of 
pl,933, the highest ever achieved by the country, will be 
regained by 1991 if all conditions outlined in the Medium-
Term Philippine Development Plan,, 1987-1992 are met. Thus, 
the immediate task is to stage a rapid and sustainable 
economic growth in order to make up for the substantial 
welfare loss. 
The new government has chosen to implement a rural-
based development strategy. This strategy directly 
addresses the goals of increasing employment, poverty 
alleviation and equitable distribution of economic benefits. 
Moreover, a natural direction of the country will be towards 
agriculture and employment-based domestic and export 
industries to reflect comparative advantage and potential. 
(Medium-Term Philippine Development 1987-1992.) This is a 
big shift in economic strategy considering the fact that the 
previous regime emphasized an urban-based industrialization 
anchored on large-scale industrial projects. 
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Despite major reforms that have been recently 
introduced, still significant constraints to the attainment 
of the development goals exist. We will briefly discuss 
them here. 
The external debt burden seems to be getting heavier 
each year. Worse is that over the past two years, 
significant net resource outflow had occurred. This is 
expected to continue in the next few years unless a new debt 
management strategy that would significantly lessen, if not 
completely reverse, the outflow, is found. For one thing, 
it has been proposed that a law making government debt 
service payments an automatic appropriation in the annual 
budget be reviewed. These resources could have been used to 
improve physical infrastructure and post-harvest facilities 
in the rural areas and to import much needed capital 
equipment to improve productivity and expand the productive 
capacity of the economy. The so-called "Multi-Year, Multi-
Sectoral Aid Plan" is being seriously considered. However, 
the capacity of the government to absorb development 
assistance seems to be weak. At present, availments of 
official development assistance have been low. Thus, the 
capabilities of national and local government to prepare, 
implement and monitor projects needs to be greatly improved. 
The appreciation of the currencies of the so-called 
newly-industrializing economies (NICs) and their graduation 
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from the GSP list of the United States is a welcome 
development to the Philippines since it makes its exports 
relatively more competitive. In addition, the currency 
appreciation coupled with rising cost of labor may prod NICs 
to transfer their industries, especially those that are 
labor-intensive, to the Philippines. This is a favorable 
development for the Philippines especially since more 
capital inflow is needed to service the external debt. In 
addition, the new industries can help absorb the growing 
labor force and also facilitate the transfer of technology. 
There are, however, other developments that could deny 
the country from enjoying the benefits from currency 
appreciation and rising labor costs in the NICs as well as 
in developed countries. One is the growing protectionist 
attitude of the Philippines' major trading partners. So 
far, the response has been to shift emphasis from quota to 
non-quota export commodities and to further intensify market 
diversification. Another factor is the slowdown in the 
growth rates of the Philippines' major trading partners. 
Even if protection is dismantled, so long as the absorptive 
capacity of major trading partners is limited, the growth of 
the Philippine exports will be severely constrained. 
Still another factor is the rapid technological 
development taking place in developed countries and the 
NICs. The increasing use of computer-based technology has 
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greatly reduced the share of the wage bill to total 
production costs. This makes exports of the NICs and even 
products of major trading partners more competitive again 
even as they continue to experience rising labor cost. 
Thus, the expected transfer of industries from developed 
countries and the NICs to developing countries would sharply 
slow down, if not completely, halt. 
Advances in biotechnology in developed countries have 
also worked against exports of the country. Specifically, 
biotechnology improves productivity and gives rise to new 
synthetic products that replace traditional commodities. 
For example, sugar production and refining in EEC has been 
greatly improved, thus making EEC an important exporter of 
sugar. Enzyme technology makes the extraction of high 
fructose corn syrup from maize possible, thus replacing 
sugar as the most important sweetener. The impact of these 
developments on the country's sugar industry is already well 
known. 
The Philippines will surely miss a lot of opportunities 
if these new international developments were not taken into 
consideration in designing economic policies and strategies. 
While neighboring Asian countries, notably China and 
Thailand, have achieved a rapid reduction in population 
growth rate, the Philippines has accomplished only a very 
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minimal reduction in population growth rate. Unfortunately, 
the present government seems to encounter difficulty in 
arriving at a consensus on population policy and program. 
Thus, while budgetary allocation for social services has 
considerably increased, funds support for family planning 
program has been very minimal and inadequate. 
The further development and efficiency of the financial 
markets need to be addressed. At present, banking 
regulations seem to be the greatest impediment. For 
instance, bank entry and branching are still overly 
restrictive which in effect grants oligopolistic power to 
existing banks. Thus, in 1988 while lending rates had been 
moving upwards, deposit rates had virtually remained the 
same and severely negative. Deposit mobilization is thus 
impaired. A study shows that increasing the number of 
financial institutions and high deposit rates attract more 
deposits especially in rural areas. Intermediation taxes, 
such as loan portfolio requirements, gross receipts tax and 
existing high legal reserve requirements need to be reviewed 
in view of their effects on lending rates. The deposit 
retention scheme is shown to adversely affect the 
profitability and savings mobilization effort of rural-based 
financial institutions. This too must be reviewed. 
Physical infrastructure and institutional support that can 
enhance the profitability of agriculture and small-scale 
enterprises must be in place to make these sectors bankable. 
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The securities markets have long been neglected by the 
government. Up until now, there is no clear policy nor 
program to develop the securities markets. The present 
policy environment is not attractive enough for companies to 
issue securities. For example, interest payments on debts 
are tax deductible while dividends on shares are not. 
Hen ce, companies prefer to borrow than to issue securities. 
Another example is that there is hardly any difference in 
the income tax paid by open and closed companies. A 
differential income tax rate that is attractive enough for 
companies to go public must be considered. 
The growth of financial intermediaries engaged in the 
development of the securities markets should be fostered. 
As of this moment, only investment companies and universal 
banks can engage in underwriting. Unfortunately, both are 
relatively inactive. In fact, investment companies have 
increasingly emphasized lending in the recent past rather 
than underwriting. Underwriting could be deregulated to 
allow other financial intermediaries, like brokers/dealers, 
to engage in it. 
A high interest rate policy designed to prop up the 
peso is not conducive to the development of the securities 
markets. Last year, several firms either postponed or 
reduced their issuances of corporate bonds and commercial 
papers in view of the high interest rate. On top of it, 
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they have to compete with short-term government securities 
which are high-yielding, risk-free assets. 
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is 
another new development in the country. It attempts to 
address equity concerns as well as poverty in the rural 
areas. The standard economic argument against land reform, 
i.e., economies of scale seems not to hold at the production 
stage. Interestingly, evidence seems to indicate that small 
farmers tend to use labor-intensive technology. Thus, land 
reform can help create job opportunities in the rural areas. 
While it is recognized that institutional and 
infrastructure support are needed to make CARP succeed, 
promoting greater linkages in the rural areas is hardly 
mentioned. Available evidence examined by Ranis and Stewart 
(1987) showed that the strongest linkage of agricultural 
growth is with consumer good industries in rural areas. 
Accordingly, the elasticity of non-agricultural employment 
with respect to growth in agricultural output is greater 
than one. Greater rural linkages could certainly sustain 
the gains from CARP. 
Privatization and re-privatization will continue to be 
an important issue in the near term. Whether the 
government should continue its direct participation in the 
production of goods, such as fertilizer, steel, etc., and 
the provision of services, such as hotel, commercial 
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banking, etc., should be re-examined. The pace of 
privatization and re-privatization has been disappointingly 
slow. The institutional framework to carry out such program 
should perhaps be reviewed. 
Finally, the role of Congress in defining development 
issues must be taken seriously. Unfortunately, however, a 
number of bills filed in Congress seem to reverse newly-
instituted policy reforms. Examples are those that propose 
to re-impose ceilings on interest rates and to compel banks 
to set aside a certain portion of their loanable funds to 
certain sectors, such as jeepney drivers and fishermen. 
There are, however, meritorious bills that tend to support 
the on-going reforms. Examples are the Central Monetary 
Authority Bill and bills seeking the abolition of 
intermediation taxes. 
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V . CONCLUSION 
Sustained economic growth and development in the medium 
term depends a great deal on two factors, namely: the 
success of reforms and the implementation of new policies, 
and a favorable world economic climate. Unfortunately, the 
prospects for positive developments in both areas are not 
too bright. The United States economy is headed towards a 
recession and the threat of protectionism has infected the 
healthy atmosphere that has pervaded in the international 
trade system. The present policy agenda of the government 
has mixed effects on the performance of the economy and it 
is expected that this will extend into the near future. On 
one hand, government programs have focused on rural 
development and greater equity, the removal of distortions 
and emphasis on efficiency, and the need for greater 
participation from the private sector. On the other hand, 
economic growth is bogged down by the lack of an imaginative 
solution to the external debt problem, the continued 
existence of monopolistic and oligopolistic elements in the 
economy that hamper the redistribution of wealth and income, 
and political maneuvering in the Congress that slows down 
the formulation of bills that enhance the welfare of the 
majority of the Filipinos. Added to this is the issue of 
graft and corruption which has a demoralizing effect on many 
people. 
41 
If the present trend will be carried over into the next 
two years, the Philippine economy is projected to 
experience a deceleration sometime towards the end of 1989. 
This slowdown will be further aggravated if the government 
agrees to the IMF demand to trim its budget deficit and if 
there is an increase in the oil price. Of course, if the 
multi-year, multi-sectoral aid plan pushes thru, then the 
slide will be averted. There is also the rapidly changing 
world environment that makes the situation very fluid. One 
interesting development is the increasingly closer 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union 
and the thaw in the Cold War. The socialist bloc remains a 
large market and a huge source of raw materials and finished 
goods. If reforms in these countries result in their closer 
integration with the world market then it may be that a 
recession in the U. S. will be less likely and in the event 
it does occur, the effects may be less severe. 
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Table I. Economic Growth, Employment, and Savings and Investment 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1. Economic Growth (annual growth 
rate in constant prices, X) 
Agriculture 3.26 (1.02) 3.08 3.77 3.B2 
Industry (1.38) 6.95 9.45 8.39 6.52 
manufacturing) 0.62 6.68 9.30 7.48 6.04 
Service 2.93 7.35 7.51 6.02 5.25 
Consumption expenditure 0.79 6.32 5.87 6.16 4.56 
Sross capital formation (9.73) 27.88 26.48 17.07 14.26 
Exports of goods and services 21.75 (1.11) 13.35 8.51 4.90 
Imports of goods and services 12.91 26.62 33.46 10.30 8.06 
Real 6DP 1.40 4.71 6.99 6.32 5.37 
Real SHP 1.84 5.94 7.07 6.44 5.30 
2. Employment 
Unemployment rates (X)t 16.76 16.81 18.66 19.54 20.30 
Mages (index, unskilled labor) 328.60 335.51 345.65 374.67 399.98 
3. Savings and Investment 
(In Billions of domestic currency) 
Domestic savings 17800.00 16100.00 15915.00 19109.00 21356.00 
National savings 16124.00 15434.00 15273.00 18544.00 20680.00 
Gross Capital Formation 10042.00 12842.00 16242.00 19016.00 21728.00 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 10057.00 11626.00 14242.00 17016.00 19228.00 
Public 2843,80 3077.45 3529.84 4312.72 4813.94 
Private 7213.20 8548.55 10712.70 12702.68 14414.16 
Increase in Stocks -15 1216 2000 2000 2500 
4. Nominal GDP 
In millions of domestic currency 624429 705671 821316 932444 1064443 
In millions of U.S. dollar 30630.74 34309.67 38924.93 42461.02 46159.71 
5. Nominal 6NP 
In millions of domestic currency 612003 700664 815926 927287 1057716 
In millions of U.S. dollar 30021.19 34066.23 38669.48 42226.18 45868 
1 
Industry includes manufacturing, lining and quarrying, electricity, gas and 
water, and transport, storage and communication. 
t Full time equivalent 
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Table II. Inflation, Money Supply and Government Budget 
1. Inflation (Annual 
changes, in per cent) 
6DP Deflator 
Consuaer Price Index 
1986 19P7 1988 1989 1990 
1.40 4.71 8.81 6.78 8.33 
0.75 3.79 8.78 7.03 8.62 
2. Honey Supply (Annual 
changes, in per cent) 
HI (narrowly defined aoney) 19.10 22.10 6.79 12.27 IS.42 
H2 (broadly defined noney) 9.65 14.21 
H3 6.21 12.82 11.24 10.57 13.96 
T-bill rates t 16.90 11.39 14.50 17.50 17.00 
3. Bovernaent Budget 
(In ii11 ions of doaestic 
currency) 
Current Revenue * 79245 
Current Expenditure t 110497 
Capital Expenditure t 14022 
Overall Surplus/deficit (31252) 
103214 114000 146300 165900 
119907 139200 169817 189507 
17327 18427 29140 35319 
(16693) (25200) (23517) (23607) 
t Assuaed values 
Table III. Trade and Balance of Payments 
(In million of U.S. dollar) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Merchandise Exports 4842 5720 6923 7892 8749 
Merchandise Iaports 5044 6737 8202 9444 10541 
Trade Balance (202) (1017) (1279) (1552) (1792) 
Workers' Remittances 696 809 
Current Account Balance 996 (539) (776) (1069) (1527) 
BOP 1242 264 (196) 1465 496 
Exchange Rates (per U.S. 
dollar: annual average)! 
20.39 20.57 21.1 21.96 23.06 
t Assuaed values 
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Table IV. Financial Flows and External Debt 
(In millions of U.S. dollar) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1 
Total Net Financial Flows 
Official developsent assistance: grant 
Official developsent assistance: loans 
Other official flows 
Direct investsient (private) 
Portfolio investment (private) 







External Debt Outstanding 
Short-term 
Long-tera 
















3057 3361 3436 3889 
2 
Debt-service Ratio (X) 34 33.3 29.68 27.14 28.25 
1 
See OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to 
Developing Countries, for definitions. 
2 
The ratio of debt service payBents to exports of goods and services. 
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